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landowners would also discourage the practice in some cases of allowing
the taxes to run on land that is not likely to be sold for lack of buyers at
the tax sale, in the hope of a settlement at a later time, through a consent
foreclosure proceeding, for a smaller amount than the taxes due. If the
lien were placed on the owner, as well as on the land, the loss through this
process to the state might be lessened. The threat of a personal action for
the payment of the unpaid real estate taxes should increase the number
that are paid, especially on vacant land in undeveloped areas, the principal
class of land on which it has been found profitable in some instances to
allow the taxes to accrue.
While the use of the personal method of the enforcement of a tax claim
will hardly end all nonpayment of taxes, it may possibly act as some
deterrent to the most flagrant violators of the tax law, those who look at
it as a speculation, hoping to, in effect, discount their property tax by
allowing it to accrue, and by means of a friendly foreclosure proceeding,
aided by the highly technical process to obtain a merchantable title to
land without the consent of the former owner, reduce the amount of tax
they pay. The in personam method of enforcement may be of some aid
in acting as a deterrent to this.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE TO SHOW NONDONATIVE INTENT IN JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
The problem of admissibility of parol evidence has been discussed by
many courts in the past with seemingly basic disagreements in regard to
the special situation where the evidence is submitted to dispute the existence of a joint bank account.
The factual situation prevalent in most of these instances has one depositor, called a donor, supplying the funds and executing a joint bank
account with another, called a donee-survivor. Both parties sign an agreement appearing on a signature card at the time of opening the account
whereby they agree with the bank that either party or the survivor is entitled to draw funds from the account with the account being the joint
property of the two depositors, and finally, the sole property of the survivor upon the death of one of the joint owners. There is no dispute when
the donor-depositor is the survivor, since the funds were originally his,
but a dispute often arises between the donee-survivor and the executor of
the donor's estate upon the death of the donor-depositor as to whether
the intent was to open up a joint account with survivorship rights, or
whether the intent was for some other reason, such as convenience.
The disagreement among the states, therefore, takes the form of whether
parol evidence may be allowed to show this other intention or whether
the agreement on the signature card is conclusive evidence of the inten-
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tion to create a survivorship relationship in the joint account. This disagreement is based in some instances upon differences in the form of the
agreement signed by the parties,' in others upon interpretation of statutes
relating to the situation,2 and in still others upon judicial pronouncement
of that state's common law.8
The greatest disagreement, however, appears to be in the District of
Columbia 4 and Illinois where the courts have reversed themselves in a
period of only a few years, finally allowing such evidentiary material to
be submitted as an exception to the parol evidence rule. This reversal is
even more noteworthy in Illinois since the same jurist has written both
contradictory opinions.
In some instances, the form of the agreement upon the signature card is
different than in others, such difference in form sometimes being the controlling factor in the court's decision as to the admissibility of parol evidence of intention contrary to the presumed intention from the agreement
itself. However, in two jurisdictions, New York (before their Banking
Act) 6 and New Jersey, 7 where the form of the agreement was of the
"special type" (an agreement each with the other and with the bank),
parol evidence was allowed by the courts to attempt to disturb the presumption of joint tenancy in the bank account. Another jurisdiction
where a dispute arose over admissibility of parol evidence to dispute a
contract of this type was Pennsylvania, where it was held in a recent decision," that since the contractual agreement was of the "special form," it
was conclusive of the intent of the parties, and no parol evidence could
be admitted to dispute it.
The "usual form" of the agreements used on the signature cards (the
account to be theirs in joint tenancy, subject to the order of either or the
' Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W. 2d 817 (1950); In re Furjanick's Estate, 375 Pa. 484, 100 A. 2d 85 (1953).
2Esling v. City Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 278 Mich. 571, 270 N.W. 791 (1936);
Ambruster v. Ambruster, 326 Mo. 51, 31 S.W. 2d 28 (1930); Marrow v. Moskowitz,
255 N.Y. 219, 174 N.E. 460 (1931); Jorgenson v. Dahlstrom, 53 Cal. App. 2d 322, 127
P. 2d 551 (1942).
8Murray v. Gadsden, 197 F. 2d 194 (App. D.C., 1952); Matthew v. Moncrief, 135
F. 2d 645 (App. D.C., 1943); In re Murdoch's Estate, 238 Iowa 898, 29 N.W. 2d 177
(1947); In re Schneider's Estate, 2 111.App. 2d 560, 120 N.E. 2d 353 (1954); Cuilini
v. Northern Trust Co., 335 Ill. App. 86, 80 N.E. 2d 275 (1948).
4Murray v. Gadsden, 197 F. 2d 194 (App. D.C., 1952); Matthew v. Moncrief, 135
F. 2d 645 (App. D.C., 1943). See also Harrington v. Emmerman, 186 F. 2d 757 (App.
D.C., 1950).
5 In re Schneider's Estate, 2 Ill. App. 2d 560, 120 N.E. 2d 353 (1954); Cuilini v.
Northern Trust Co., 335 111.App. 86, 80 N.E. 2d 275 (1948).
6 In re Reynolds' Estate, 97 N.Y. Misc. 555, 163 N.Y. Supp. 812 (Surr. Ct., 1916).
7
Kely v. Kelly, 135 N.J. Eq. 75, 37 A. 2d 288 (1944).
8

In re Furjanick's Estate, 375 Pa. 484, 100 A. 2d 85 (1953),
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survivor) makes no express mention of any agreement between the parties
themselves, the contractual agreement being between the two parties and
the bank. This is the form of the signature card agreements which the
courts in the various jurisdictions interpreted in deriving their conclusions as to the admissibility of parol evidence to disrupt the presumption
of joint tenancy.
The decision in the case of Matthew v. Moncrief 9 was a pronouncement
of the law expounded by the late Chief Justice Vinson when he was an
Associate Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. In this case, Justice Vinson made a nationwide analysis of
the law on the question and arrived at what he considered a logical conclusion in denying the admissibility of parol evidence. In a unanimous
opinion, it was held by the court that the signature card agreement was
on its face conclusive evidence that the donor-depositor intended a joint
account with survivorship rights, and although parol evidence was available to the effect that the donee-survivor understood that the intent of
the donor was a joint account for convenience only, such evidence was
inadmissible. The court here was of the opinion that since the contract
was in itself conclusive and complete on its face, no parol evidence could
be admitted to change the intent expressed by the contract-this because
of the parol evidence rule, which allows such evidence only in cases of
fraud, undue influence, or mistake.
This decision was overruled nine years later by the same court in the
case of Murray v. Gadsden,10 where the court held unanimously that
parol evidence was admissible to show an intent contrary to that presumed
from the agreements on the signature cards. The court here stated:
This is a salutary exception to the parol evidence rule, because a court of
equity should not permit the rule to defeat the admitted, or clearly proved intention of the parties. It should be remembered too that a writing which is
called a contract is merely a memorial of the parties' agreement. It is simply
evidence of the agreement and, if it be clear that it does not accurately reflect
what the parties had agreed upon, monstrous injustice would be done by forcing upon them a contract which they had not actually made .... This exception to the parol evidence rule ... permits inquiry into the real purpose of the
parties ... and amendment of the writing to accomplish that purpose."
The court concluded in very concise terms that when an allegation of
contrary intent is made, parol evidence is admissible to show that the intent
of the signers was contrary to the presumption arising from the agreement. If a variance of intent was found, the court could reform the written agreement to express the actual intention of the parties. This court
expressly overruled the prior Matthew case, stating that this exception to
135 F. 2d 645 (App. D.C., 1943).
10 197 F. 2d 194 (App. D.C., 1952).
9

11 Ibid., at 201.
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the parol evidence rule was apparently overlooked and should have been
recognized and applied. We find, therefore, that the present law of the
District of Columbia allows parol evidence to rebut the presumption of a
joint tenancy bank account with right of survivorship.
The situation in Illinois is quite comparable to that in the District of
Columbia since the case of Cuilini v. Northern Trust Co. 12 was decided

on the basis of the agreements on the signature cards being a conclusive,
irrebuttable contract of joint tenancy and survivorship between the
parties, and the recent case of In re Schneider's Estate,13 which overruled
the Cuilinicase, was decided upon the same logical analysis as the Murray
case. The court in the Cuilini case follows the strict parol evidence rule
to the effect that where the writing is unambiguous on its face and definitely sets up a joint tenancy situation with survivorship rights, no parol
evidence will be admissible to show that a contrary result was intended
unless, of course, fraud, undue influence, or mistake is alleged. Justice
Lewe appeared quite satisfied with the results of the exhaustive review of
the decisions made by Justice Vinson in the Matthew case, and concludes
that the Cuilini case is another restatement of the weight of authority.
The parol evidence offered in this case was that of the donee-survivor
who was called as an adverse witness and testified to the fact that the
intention of the donor-depositor was to open a joint account for convenience, and not one with present and survivorship rights in the two parties.
These facts are quite similar to those in the Matthew case where the survivor also knew that there was no intention that she should eventually
become the sole owner of the funds in the joint account, but due to the
inadmissibility of the parol evidence showing this, she was "forced" to
accept same.
Justice Lewe, in the Schneider case, apparently became impressed with
the more equitable view of the situation as expounded in the Murray case,
and in the court's decision accepted the reasoning of that case and stated
that the law in Illinois was now to the effect that in situations of this type
where a donor-depositor opens a joint banking account with a doneesurvivor, the agreement signed by the parties on the signature card is no
longer conclusive evidence of the intent. The admissibility of parol evidence protects the equitable rights of the parties and removes the injustice
which would be present if the contrary decision were upheld. The court
also likens the strict contract theory, which it rejects, to the significance
of the written word at early common law, and states:
. . . if the formal word was given, a party was bound, however unrighteous
the circumstances may have been under which he gave it.14
12335 111. App. 86, 80 N.E. 2d 275 (1948).
132 Ill. App. 2d 560, 120 NE. 2d 353 (1954).

14 Ibid., at 566 and 356.
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Four states have enacted legislation on this question with slightly different results appearing therefrom in judicial interpretation. 5 The New York
statute, 16 upon which the other statutes were apparently based, is limited
to joint savings accounts and is silent in regard to other forms of joint
banking accounts, while the statutes enacted by the other states apply to
all joint banking accounts. New York court decisions are, however, in
line with the Murray and Schneider cases in their results when the bank
account was other than a savings account. 17 These courts treat the signed
agreements on the signature cards as rebuttable presumptions of intent to
execute a joint account with survivorship rights, and parol evidence is admitted to rebut the presumption.
The court in the case of Marrow v. Moskowitz' 8 interprets the New

York statute on joint savings accounts in the same manner that the California courts interpreted the California Statute. 19 The interpretations are
to the effect that where both parties to the joint bank account agreement
are alive, the presumption of intent to institute a joint tenancy with rights
of survivorship can be rebutted by parol evidence. However, where the
donor-depositor has died, the prior rebuttable presumption becomes conclusive, and no parol evidence will be admitted to disturb the survivor's
resulting ownership of the money remaining in the account except for
the allowable grounds, under the parol evidence rule, of fraud, duress, or
20
mistake.
A California Appellate Court discussed the situation from a very specialized aspect in the case of Jarkieh v. Badagliacco.21 The donor-depositor
had died and the executor of the donor's estate alleged a trust. The court
recognized that the joint account agreement was conclusive when one
party had died, but allowed parol evidence to establish the trust. Their
opinion was to the effect that the conclusive presumption of legal title
vesting in the survivor would not be disturbed if a trust were proved. The
establishment of the trust by parol evidence would still leave the legal title
vested in the survivor, but such legal title would be held in trust for the
use of another.

The Missouri Statute 22 was interpreted by the court in the case of

15 California, Michigan, Missouri and New York.
16 N.Y. Banking Law (McKinney, 1950) §§ 134, subd. 3, 394, subd. 1.
17 In re Dreschler's Estate, 282 App. Div. 4, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 128 (1953); In re
Golden's Estate, 129 N.Y.S. 2d 855 (Surr. Ct., 1954); In re Fisher's Will, 183 N.Y.
Misc. 792, 50 N.Y.S. 2d 894 (Sur. Ct., 1944).
18 255 N.Y. 219, 174 N.E. 460 (1931).
19 California Banking Code (Deering, 1949) § 852.
20 Paterson v. Comastri, 39 Cal. 2d 66, 244 P. 2d 902 (1952); Jorgenson v. Dahlstrom, 53 Cal. App. 2d 322, 127 P. 2d 551 (1942).
2175 Cal. App. 2d 505, 170 P. 2d 994 (1946).
22 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) § 363.740.
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Ambruster v. Ambruster23 to mean that parol evidence would be admissible to rebut the presumption of a joint tenancy with survivorship rights.
This was reiterated by the court in the case of Commerce Trust Co. v.
Watts24 by way of dicta. The agreement in the Watts case was of the
"special form" and no parol evidence was allowed, but the court indicated
that where the agreement was not so explicit, parol evidence would be
allowed to rebut the presumption.
The Michigan Statute expressly states that signing such an agreement
on the signature cards is prima facie evidence of the joint tenancy and
25
survivorship thereby allowing parol evidence to show a contrary intent.
The Michigan court has so held in the case of Esling v. City Nat'l Bank
26
and Trust Co.
The states of Arizona and Iowa appear to be the only jurisdictions
remaining in the United States where the agreement signed on the signature card is considered an absolute contract, and no parol evidence is adnissible except where fraud, duress, or mistake is alleged. This point of
27
view was succinctly set forth in the case of In re Murdoch's Estate
where the Iowa court stated:
We view the present writings, so-called signature cards in the same light:
Under our rules of construction, in the absence of a plea of fraud, duress, or
mistake, we are bound by the plain and expressed terms of the agreement.
28
Extrinsic evidence tending to change this expressed intent, is not competent.
Two later cases Iowa reaffirm this view. 29 The court in the case of Hill
v. Havens30 explained that while the two previous decisions arose from
actions at law, and the one directly in question arose from an action in
equity, since equity follows the law, the resulting decision is the same.
The Arizona court held quite similarly in the case of Sheridan v. Klee3
71ian. 1

The Utah Supreme Court in a series of cases before it, has come to a
conclusion quite similar to that arrived at by the California and New
York courts. The Utah courts hold that where the donor-depositor has
died, the presumption of joint tenancy with survivorship rights is conclusive and no parol evidence is admissible. However, during the lifetimes of
23 326 Mo. 51, 31 S.W. 2d 28 (1930).
24 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W. 2d 817 (1950).
25 Mich. L. (1948) § 487.703.
26 278 Mich. 571, 270 N.W. 791 (1936).
27 238 Iowa 898, 29 N.W. 2d 177 (1947).
28 Ibid., at 903 and 179.
29 Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W. 2d 870 (1951); McManis v. Keokuk Say.
Bank and Trust Co., 239 Iowa 1105, 33 N.W. 2d 410 (1948).
30242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W. 2d 870 (1951).
3175 Ariz. 319, 256 P. 2d 558 (1953).
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conboth depositors, such parol evidence, as well as any other clear 3 and
2
vincing evidence, could be used to overcome the presumption.
The courts of New Jersey have held for many years that signed agreements appearing on signature cards merely indicate that a joint account
33
had been opened in the names of the two parties. The agreements also
raised the rebuttable presumption that a joint tenancy with survivorship
had been intended by the parties. These courts, therefore, held that parol
evidence was admissible at any time to overcome the presumption. This
36
view has also been held by courts in Delaware,3 4 Massachusetts, 3 5 Ohio,
38
37
Oregon, and Pennsylvania, with the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts perhaps giving the best analysis of the reasons for their stand in
the case of Ball v. Forbes.39 The court stated:
It is settled that while the contract of deposit is conclusive as between the
parties and the bank, and that the contract with the bank takes the place of
delivery ordinarily required, and that a present gift could thus be made if that
result was intended even though the deceased retained control of the books
evidencing the deposits, nevertheless, as between the survivor and the representative of the estate of the deceased, it is still open to the latter to show by
attendant facts and circumstances that the deceased did not intend to make a
account, and that the mere form of the
present gift of a joint interest in the
40
deposit does not settle the matter.
Thus it is seen that a majority of the courts ruling on this situation have
adopted the more reasonable view allowing the introduction of parol evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties. This seems to be the more
logical holding, for it is quite difficult to comprehend how a court can
decide the intention of the involved parties one way, when one of the litigants, the donee-survivor, is able to testify to the contrary. It seems rather
unusual to realize that given a certain set of facts, money may be forced
on an individual when he readily admits he is not entitled to receive it,
but, as we have seen by the Mattbew and Cuilini cases, such a situation
can arise in the few jurisdictions disallowing the introduction of parol
Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P. 2d 194 (1949); Neill v. Royce, 101
Utah 181, 120 P. 2d 327 (1941); Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P. 2d 715 (1934).
33
Lester v. Guenther, 134 N.J. Eq. 53, 33 A. 2d 815 (1943); Trenton Sav. Fund
Soc. v. Byrnes, 110 N.J. Eq. 617, 160 Atl. 831 (1932); Kaufman v. Edwards, 92 N.J.
32

Eq. 554, 113 Ad. 598 (1921); Link v. Link, 3 N.J. Super. 295, 65 A. 2d 89 (1949).
3
4 Rauhut v. Reinhart, 22 Del. Ch. 431, 180 Atl. 913 (Orphans Ct., 1935).
35 Drain v. Brookline Say. Bank, 327 Mass. 435, 99 N.E. 2d 160 (1951); Ball v.
Forbes, 314 Mass. 200, 49 N.E. 2d 898 (1943).
36 Steiner v. Fecycz, 72 Ohio App. 18, 50 N.E. 2d 617 (1942).
37 State v. Gralewski's Estate, 176 Ore. 448, 159 P. 2d 211 (1945); Holbrook v. Hendrick's Estate, 175 Ore. 159, 152 P. 2d 573 (1944).
88 Dempsey v. First Nat'l Bank of Scranton, 359 Pa. 177, 58 A. 2d 14 (1948);
Glessner v. Security-Peoples Trust Co., 156 Pa. Super. 56, 39 A. 2d 165 (1944).
40 Ibid., at 202 and 900.
39 314 Mass. 200, 49 N.E. 2d 898 (1943).
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evidence. As has been stated before, the trend seems to be towards allowing such evidence, and it would seem that eventually the remaining
courts which have not as yet ruled on this question should have no
trouble when such a question arises, as the rule herein advocated seems
clearly to be the more rational view.
CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-IMMUNITY
FROM TORT LIABILITY
American courts seem to be drawing further and further away from
the idea that charitable institutions should not be held liable in tort actions.
Ever since 1871, when the idea that a charitable institution might be
immune from liability for its torts was first introduced into our system of
laws, this concept has created such a divergence of legal opinion that it
would seem to be almost irreconcilable as a basic legal concept.
The theory is simply that these institutions, such as hospitals, churches,
YMCA's, universities and the like, because they exist mainly on donated
trust funds and supposedly are not interested in making a profit, should
be exempt from the application of general tort rules which otherwise
would be applied.
HISTORICAL FALLACY

A brief glance at the history of the immunity doctrine will show that
possibly with a little more research on the part of our early American
jurists, the doctrine might never have appeared at all in the United States.
The doctrine declaring charitable institutions' immune from tort liability was first declared in this country in McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital,2 where in sole reliance upon the English case of Holliday
v. St. Leonard3 the court held that the funds of a charitable hospital could
not be diminished by a charity patient's claim for damage resulting in
unskilled treatment by the house surgeon, if due care had been exercised
in selecting the surgeon. Nine years later, in 1885, in Perry v. House of

Refuge, 4 again solely on the strength of a second early English case5 the
1 The majority of the cases herein discussed involve the tort liability of charitable
or non-governmental corporations as distinguished from governmental charities. Cases
involving the tort liability of the trustee of an unincorporated charitable trust have
been included in so far as they present questions peculiar to the liability of the trust
as distinguished from the liability of the trustee as an individual.
2 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
a 11 C.B. N.S. 192, 123 E.R. 169 (1861). This case involved an action against the
vestry of a parish. The court said this was a public body, clothed with a public trust,
and refused to sustain an action for injury caused by a defect in a highway under

its control.
463 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1885).

5The decision was based on the case of Heriots Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F.

507, 8 E.R. 1508 (1846), involving an action for wrongful exclusion from the benefits of the defendant charity, and not for personal injury inflicted in its operation.

